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ca.se should be subject to criminal prosecution, 
or the imposition of penalties under the market 
abuse provisions.'
No guidance from the Treasury has, 
however, as yet been published, although 
this may simply be due to the fact that 
the new regime will not come into force 
until next year. In any case, the question 
arises as to what extent this guidance will 
be legally binding: if it is mere guidance, 
the FSA (who will have the power to 
bring prosecutions for insider dealing) or 
the Crown Prosecution Service may be 
free to disregard it. The general
o o
assumption that no one could ever both 
be prosecuted and suffer the imposition 
of civil fines is a dangerous one. In
o
France, for example, insider dealing is, as 
in the UK, prohibited under both the 
criminal law (Article 10-1 of Ordinance 
67-833 of 28 September 1967 (as 
amended)) and an administrative 
regulation (COB Regulation 90-08). It is 
rare for a given case to be dealt with and 
punished under both provisions, but it 
has been known, notably in the case of
Delalande/Synthelabo, in which a director 
through insider dealing made a profit
O O 1
estimated at FF69.5m (approx. £7m). 
Following proceedings under the COB 
regulation, in which he was fined the 
maximum penalty of FFlOm (approx. 
£lm), the director was then also 
prosecuted under the Ordinance. 
Although, in the event, the court
o
imposed no further penalty other than to 
order that he pay the costs of the hearing, 
the principle had clearly been established 
that regulatory proceedings of this type 
do not automatically rule out a criminal 
prosecution. Since the FSA is arguably a 
unitary authority modelled on those of 
other jurisdictions, such as the COB, it 
may well be that in time such principles 
are adopted in the UK as well.
Clause 99 of the Bill requires the FSA 
to publish a statement of its policy in 
relation to the imposition of penalties for 
market abuse. Sub-clause (2) makes 
clear, however, that the FSA is 
empowered to alter or replace that policy 
should it see fit, although if it does so it
must publish the replacement or 
alterations. It is not clear, however, what 
redress a person fined by the FSA other 
than under the published policy would 
have. There would arguably be grounds 
for judicial review on the basis that, 
whether or not it was actually illegal, it 
might be unreasonable for the FSA, 
having published a policy in accordance 
with its legal obligations, then to depart 
from it. Nevertheless the possibility 
cannot be ruled out that the Divisional 
Court might be less than sympathetic to a 
person who had recently been convicted 
of insider dealing or misleading investors.
o o
To conclude, much remains unclear at 
this stage. It may well be that only a series 
of test cases will ultimately show the 
extent to which criminal prosecutions 
and civil fines may run in parallel. @
Peter Richards-Carpenter
Head oj Financial Services, Rowe &^Maw
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The Community legislation concerningJ o o
the authorisation of medicinal products is 
of considerable complexity. However, the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) has 
recently elucidated the controversial 
meaning of the concept of 'essential 
similarity' in its recent decision in R v 
Medicines Control Agency ex pane Generics
(Case C-368/96, not yet reported). It 
will be impossible to understand this 
ruling without some elementary 
understanding of the relevant provisions 
of the applicable Community' legislation.
According to Council Regulation 
2309/93 (OJ 1993 L214/1), 
authorisations of certain medicinal 
products must take place at Community 
level. Other such products require 
authorisation by the competent authority 
of the relevant member state (in this case 
the Licensing Authority established by 
the Medicines Act 1968, acting by means of 
the Medicines Control Agency) before 
they can be marketed, in accordance with 
the provisions of Council Directive 65/65 
(OJ 1965-1966, Eng. Spec. Ed., p. 20), 
subsequently amended by Council 
Directive 75/318 (OJ 1975 El47/1),
Council Directive 87/21 (OJ 1987 
115/36), Council Directive 93/39 (OJ 
1993 L214/22) and Commission 
Regulation 541/95 (OJ 1995 E55/7).
An application for authorisation is 
required by art. 4(2).8 of Council 
Directive 6S/65/ (as amended) to be 
accompanied by the results of certain 
tests and clinical trials (which generally 
involve the use of humans or animals). 
However, the applicant is not required to 
provide the results of pharmacological 
and toxicological tests or the results of 
clinical trials under three circumstances. 
Thus, art. 4(2).8(a)(iii) provides that 
such results are not required if the 
applicant can demonstrate that the 
product is essentially similar to one 
which has already been authorised within 
the Community for six or ten years and
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which is marketed in the member state in 
which the application is made. (The 
period is extended to ten years for certain 
high technology medicinal products, and 
member states have a discretion to 
extend the period to ten years for all 
products marketed on their territory. 
The UK has availed itself of this option.) 
This abridged procedure enables a 
second applicant for marketing 
authorisation for a particular product to 
save the time and expense necessary in 
order to gather the pharmacological, 
toxicological and clinical data. It also 
avoids, on public policy grounds, the 
repetition of tests on humans or animals 
where not absolutely necessary.
Large pharmaceutical companies often 
spend very considerable amounts 
on research, and this is sometimes 
reflected in changes to the medicinal 
product which give rise to changes in 
marketing authorisations. Annex II to 
Commission Regulation 541/95 provides 
that certain changes to a marketing 
authorisation are to be considered as 
fundamentally altering the terms ot that 
authorisation and therefore require an 
application for a new marketing 
authorisation to be made rather than 
merely an application to vary the terms of 
the marketing authorisation. Among the 
changes which require such a new 
application are, inter alia, the addition of 
an indication in a different therapeutic 
area, the addition of a new strength and 
the addition of a new route of 
administration.
FACTS
The principal litigation in the case 
annotated consisted of applications for 
judicial review of decisions made by the 
Medicines Control Agency in the context 
of applications for authorisation under 
the abridged procedure governed by art. 
4(2).8(a) of Directive 65/65, as 
amended, by generics distributors and 
manufacturers. The pharmaceutical 
companies   Squibb, Wellcome and 
Glaxo   contended that an essentially 
similar medicinal product should only be 
granted a marketing authorisation under 
the abridged procedure for indications 
which had been authorised in any 
member state for six or ten years. The 
generics companies (Generics and Gea) 
took the different view that such 
authorisations should be granted ino
respect of all indications, dosage forms, 
or dosage schedules currently authorised
for the relevant product of the date of the 
application under art. 4(2).8(a)(iii), 
irrespective of whether they had been 
authorised for at least six or ten vears.
QUESTIONS REFERRED 
UNDER ART. 177
The Queens Bench Division referred 
five questions to the ECJ for a preliminary 
ruling under art. 177 (art. 234, post 
Amsterdam). The most detailed of these 
questions were the first three.
The first question was principally 
concerned with the meaning of the 
phrase 'essentially similar' in art. 
4(2).8(a)(iii) of Council Directive 65/65, 
as amended, and whether the competent 
authority of a member state has any 
margin of discretion in determining the
o o
criteria according to which the essential 
similarity of two different products is to 
be judged.
The second and third questions 
concerned in essence what therapeutic 
indications and dosage schedules might 
be authorised under the abridged 
procedure provided for in art. 
4(2).8(a)(iii) of Directive 65/65, as 
amended, in respect of a medicinal 
product which is essentially similar to one 
that has been authorised for not less than 
six or ten years in the Community, and is 
marketed in the member state in which 
the application is made. As is apparent 
from the detailed formulation of these 
questions it was possible to take four 
different views as to the correct answers 
to them.
The fourth question (which finds some 
reflection in the approach taken to 
changes of great therapeutic significance 
by the UK Government) was whether any 
difference was made to the answers to the 
second and third questions according to 
whether the original or abridged 
applications for marketing authorisations 
were made before the date of entry into 
force of Regulation 541/95.
o
The fifth question involved the 
interesting issue of whether art. 
4(2).8(a)(iii) was invalid because it 
conflicted with the need to protect 
innovation and/or one of the general 
principles of Community law. Provisions 
in Community' legislation may be invalid 
if they conflict with fundamental 
principles of Community law.
The ECJ found that a medicinal 
product might be essentially similar to an
earlier medicinal product, even though it 
had different indications and dosages.
JUDGMENT OF THE ECJ
A more detailed account of the court's 
judgment is given below.
Answer to Question 1
The court somewhat controversially 
made reference to a declaration recorded 
in the minutes of the Council on the 
occasion of the adoption of Directive 
87/21 for the purpose of interpreting the 
meaning of the concept of an 'essentially 
similar medical product'. Despite the 
court's attempt to distinguish these cases 
it seems somewhat difficult to reconcile 
this approach with its statements in R v 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex pane 
Antonissen (Case C-292/89) [1991] ECR 
1-745; [1993] 1 CEC 649, para. 18) and 
Re VAG Sverige AR (Case C-329/95) 
[1997] ECR 1-2675, para. 232) that such 
a declaration could not be used for the 
purpose of interpreting a provision unless 
it was referred to in the wording of theo
provision. According to the minutes of 
the relevant Council meeting, the criteria 
determining the concept of essential 
similarity between medicinal products 
are that they have the same quantitative 
and qualitative composition in terms of 
active principles, and the same 
pharmaceutical form, and where 
necessary bioequivalence of the two 
products has been established by 
appropriate bioavailability studies.
The court pointed out that it followed 
from the latest edition of the 
Commission's Rules governing medicinal 
products in the European Union that a 
medicinal product which satisfied the 
three criteria mentioned above might 
nevertheless raise questions of safety with 
regard to its excipients (additives, 
consisting of neutral or inert substances). 
In such an event the medicinal product 
could not be regarded as essentially 
similar to an original medicinal product 
where it satisfied the three criteria laid 
out in the minute of the Council. The 
position was the same where a medical 
product satisfied the three criteria for 
essential similarity', but it was apparent in 
the light of scientific knowledge that it 
differed significantly from the original 
product as regards efficiency or safety. 
The court also held that the competent 
authority7 of a member state could not 
disregard the three stated criteria, where 
it had to determine essential similarity. 23
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(Note the similar approach to the 
existence of a margin of discretion in 
applying the exceptions in art. 
4(2).8(a)(iii) in A v Ikcmin^ /lurAohfy o
ArJ (Case C-440/93 
[ 1 995] ECR 1-285 1 ) and A i 7?ie . 
Con fro/ /ycncy, e.\ ptirfc ^mifn &_
ZfJ; fnmecmwTi AfJ w 7?ie 
Con fro/ /l^enc^ (Case C-201/94 
[1996] ECRI-S819; [1997] CEC 513).
It should be noted that the court did 
not treat the possession of the same 
therapeutic indications as a relevant factor 
in determining essential similarity.
The court's answer to the first question 
was substantially the same as that given to 
it hy Advocate General Ruiz-Jabaro in his 
submissions. However, there was some 
difference between the approach taken by 
the court and the Advocate General in 
their answers to the second question.
(o Question* 2 and 3
As already indicated, the court adopted 
the view that therapeutic indications 
were irrelevant for the purpose of 
establishing essential similarity. It held 
that it followed from this that an 
applicant for a marketing authorisation 
for a medicinal product that is essentially 
similar to a product which has been 
authorised for not less than six or ten 
years in the Community and is marketed 
in the member state for which the 
application is made is not required, 
under the provision at issue, to supply 
pharmacological, toxicological and 
clinical documentation, whatever may be 
the therapeutic indications to which the 
documentation for the original medicinal 
product relates. The court concluded 
that under the abridged procedure 
provided for in art. 4(2).8(a)(iii) of 
Directive 65/65, as amended, the 
applicant might receive marketing 
authorisation tor all the therapeutic 
indications covered by the latter 
documentation, including those 
indications authorised lor less than six or 
ten years.
There seems some reason to doubt 
whether the proposition in the final 
sentence in the above paragraph 
necessarily follows from that in the 
second one in the same paragraph. It may 
not be an inevitable consequence of the 
fact that because the later applicant does 
not have to supply documentation 
relating to pharmaceutical, toxicological
and clinical tests, that pharmaceutical 
company is entitled to receive 
documentation for all the relevant 
therapeutic indications.
It is rather unfortunate that, because 
the application of point 8(a)(iii) of the 
second paragraph of Directive 65/65, as 
amended, requires the reconciliation of 
different objectives, it is rather difficult 
to interpret. As already indicated, two of 
these objectives consist of the protection 
of public health and the prevention of 
unnecessary tests on humans or animals, 
but another one of equal importance 
consists of the protection of innovation 
and pharmacalogical research.
With the latter objective in mind, 
there seems considerable force in Ruiz- 
Jabaro AG's view that it would be 
advisable to apply the six or ten-year 
protection period to all new indications 
of considerable importance authorised 
for an original product essentially similar 
to a generic product. (The UK 
Government and the Commission 
adopted a rather similar approach to 
Ruiz-Jabaro AG.) However, it has been 
contended by the court that the concept 
of a major therapeutic indication may 
give rise to uncertainties. The advocate 
general suggested that it should beo oo
possible for the competent authorities of 
member states to resolve these difficulties 
on a case by case basis, account being 
taken of whether the significance of the 
therapeutic benefit can be proved to the 
European Agency for the Evaluation of 
Medicinal Products and whether the new 
indication is eligible for a patent under 
the Munich Convention or national law; 
and the scope of the tests carried out by 
the innovative undertaking to discovero
the new therapeutic indication for the 
original medicinal product.
It appears that the court's approach to 
the above problem may sometimes lead 
pharmaceutical companies to expend 
very considerable sums on innovative 
research without enjoying adequate 
protection for the end result. Although a 
new therapeutic indication may be 
eligible for a patent under the Munich 
Convention, or under the national law of 
a member state, the material required of 
those requesting authorisation is not fully 
protected. However, the use of the 
concept of major therapeutic innovation 
in the manner suggested by the advocate 
general might lead to occasional
o C*
uncertainties.
Both the court and the advocate 
general adopted the view that a medicinal 
product which is essentially similar to a 
product which has been authorised for 
not less than six or ten years in the 
Community and is marketed in the 
member state in which the application is 
made mav be authorised under the 
abridged procedure provided for in art. 
4(2).8(a)(iii) of Directive 65/65 as 
amended, for all dosage forms, doses and
' o
dosage schedules already authorised for 
that product.
LACK OF PROTECTION
It appears that the court's approach 
to the.... problem may sometimes 
lead pharmaceutical companies to 
expend very considerable sums on 
innovative research without enjoying 
adequate protection for the end 
result.
(o
The answer of the court to the fourth 
question was also similar to that of the 
advocate general. The court found that 
Regulation 541/95 had no relevance 
whatsoever to the application of art. 
4(2).8(a)(iii) of Directive 65/65, as 
amended. The former instrument 
distinguishes between minor and major 
variations in the terms of marketing 
authorisations but, as the Advocate 
General pointed out, a therapeutic 
innovation is not a relevant factor for the 
purpose of classifying variations as major 
or minor. (The Medicines Control 
Agency had taken the view that where a 
new application for marketing 
authorisation was required under Annex 
II to Regulation 541/95, marketing 
authorisation under the abridged 
procedure could not be granted in 
respect of additions or changes that were 
the subject of a first marketing 
authorisation until a period of ten years 
had elapsed since the date on which it 
was granted.)
fo
The court, which once again agreed 
with the advocate general, found that the 
validity of art. 4(2).8(a)(iii) of Directive 
65/65 as amended, was not affected by 
the principles of protection of 
innovation, and/or non-discrimination 
and/or proportionality and/or respect for 
property. Only the three latter principles 
are general principles of Community law
Curiae fwue 20 / 999
However, the second recital in the 
preamble to Directive 87/21 mentions 
that innovative firms should not he put at 
a disadvantage by the new provisions 
relating to the authorisation of essentially 
similar medicinal products. (This 
principle may conflict to some extent 
with that in the fourth recital stating that 
there are reasons of public policy for not 
conducting repetitive tests on humans or 
animals without overriding cause).
The court held that no violation of the 
principle of non-discrimination occurred 
in permitting a second applicant to refer 
to the results of pharmacological and 
toxicological tests and clinical trials, the 
costs of which are borne by the first 
applicant. This was because the first and 
second applicants were not in 
comparable situations: the first applicant 
could show the cfficacv and safety of the 
product only by means of tests, whilst the 
second applicant might merely refer to 
the data relating to the efficacy and safety 
of the original product which the first 
applicant had supplied without creating a 
risk to public health. This argument does 
not, with respect appear entirely 
convincing, because it is obvious that the 
second applicant is not in the same 
position as the first one with respect to 
costs.
The pharmaceutical companies had 
argued that the interpretation of art. 
4(2).8(a)(iii) of Directive 65/65, as 
amended, would make the provision 
disproportionate to the aim of the 
abridged procedure. It is not surprising 
that the court refused to invoke the 
principle of proportionality as a ground 
for the invalidity of art. 4(2).8(a)(iii). 
The court has generally shown itself 
unwilling to conclude that policy choices 
enshrined in Community legislation are 
disproportionate. Thus, in a sphere in 
which the Community legislature is 
called upon to make complex 
assessments, judicial review of the 
exercise of its powers must be limited to 
examining whether it is vitiated by a 
manifest error of assessment or misuse of 
powers, or whether the legislature has 
manifestly exceeded the limits of its 
discretion (see TVorbrooA laboratories r 
yWXff Case C-127/95 [1998] ECRI- 
1531).
The court found that where it was clear 
that the medicinal product which was the 
subject of an abridged application under 
art. 4(2).8(a)(iii) was essentially similar
to a product which had been authorised 
in the Community and was marketed in 
the member state for which the 
application was made, the results of 
pharmalogical tests and clinical trials 
covering all the therapeutic indications 
authorised might be transposed to the 
medical product which was the subject 
matter of that application. Repetition of 
such trials was not necessary to protect 
public health; furthermore one of the 
objects of the abridged procedure was to 
avoid the unnecessary repetition of tests 
on humans or animals. The interests of 
innovative firms was, according to the 
court's (somewhat questionable) finding, 
sufficiently safeguarded by granting them 
a period of protection for their data of six 
or ten years from the date of the first 
marketing authorisation obtained in the 
Community for a particular product.
Thus the court found that the abridged 
procedure, as interpreted in the 
judgment, was an appropriate and 
reasonable means of reconciling the three 
aims of art. 4(2).8(a)(iii) of Directive 
65/65, which are made apparent in the 
recitals to Directive 65/65 and in the 
recitals to the amending Directive 87/21 
It is clear and unsurprising in view of its 
earlier jurisprudence, that the court did 
not apply the principle of proportionality 
in a very rigorous manner in the present 
case.
Finally, the court considered the 
allegations of the infringement of the
o O
principles of the protection of innovation 
and of respect for the right of property. It 
found that, because the alleged 
infringement of the principle of 
protection of innovation coincided, in 
the present case, with the alleged 
infringement of the principle of respect 
for the right of property, these two 
questions could be examined together.
As was emphasised by the court, it was 
apparent from its case law that the 
exercise of the right to property may be 
restricted provided that the restrictions 
in fact correspond to objectives of 
general interest pursued by the 
Community and do not constitute 
disproportionate and unacceptable 
interference, impairing the very 
substance of the right guaranteed (see 
firma 5/Ltf .ScAj^aArf Gm6JY y Germany 
(Joined Cases C-248/95 and C-249/95 
[1997] ECR 1-4475) and Metronome 
/WujjA Gm67Y y Afujic fbint Afo^amp GmoAf 
(Case C-200/96 [1998] ECR 1-1953).
The court found that art. 4(2).8(a) (iii) 
was in accordance with objectives of 
general public importance pursued by the 
Community. Furthermore, it held that 
the provision at issue could not be 
regarded as disproportionate or 
unacceptable interference impairing the 
very substance of the right to property 
because it does not appear to have 
rendered it virtually impossible for 
innovating firms to carry on their 
business of producing and developing 
medicinal products. This conclusion is 
unsurprising in view of the earlier 
jurisprudence of the court.
CONCLUSIONS
The above decision will no doubt 
prove somewhat burdensome for 
pharmaceuticals companies but, as the 
ECJ pointed out, it is unlikely to prevent 
them from carrying on business. They 
may also initiate a campaign seeking 
changes in the law. The ECJ's 
interpretation of the meaning of 
'essentially similar' appears 
unexceptionable. (It may be contrasted 
with the interpretation given by the High 
Court in the unreported case of R ; 
AfeJicJnei Control Agency ex parfe 
RAone-fou7enc, according to which 
essential similarity had to be determied 
on the basis of the therapeutic value and 
active agent of the drug.)
However, the ECJ's answer to the second 
question does not seem justified: it might 
have been better if a different rule had 
been adopted providing that new 
indications for the original medicinal
o
product which are of considerable 
therapeutic importance and that are 
authorised for an original medicinal
c?
product essentially similar to a generic 
medicinal product should benefit from 
the six or ten-year protection period.
The court's approach to the third and 
fourth questions appears correct. 
Furthermore, the somewhat cautious 
approach which it adopted in answering 
the fifth question is understandable in 
the light of its earlier jurisprudence 
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